Christos Tzamos

Email:
@mit.edu
tzamos mymail
Phone:
909-1739
(617)- myphone
Office: 32-G630, Stata Center
Web: christos.me
Google Scholar | DBLP | arXiv | Github
About | Research | Awards

Christos Tzamos

I study Computer Science in the Theory of Computation group at MIT where I am advised by Constantinos Daskalakis.

My research interests include Algorithmic Game Theory, Learning Theory as well as the Design, Analysis and Theory of Algorithms.

About

I joined the graduate program of MIT on September 2011 in the Theory of Computation group at CSAIL. My PhD advisor is Costis Daskalakis and I enjoy working with him on a wide range of problems from auction theory to learning theory.

I grew up in Athens, Greece where I also had my undergraduate studies at the National Technical University of Athens (Sept. 2006 - June 2011). During my time there, I had the opportunity to work with my advisor Dimitris Fotakis on different problems in mechanism design without money.

I spent the summer of 2014 as a research intern at Yahoo! Labs, Sunnyvale working with Chris Wilkens on multiple research and practical questions regarding online ad auctions. I also interned for Google, Cambridge in the mobile search team during summer 2012.

Research

I am interested in Algorithmic Game Theory, Learning Theory as well as in the Design, Analysis and Theory of Algorithms.

Journal Articles

  1. Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
    Econometrica (forthcoming)
  2. Efficient Money Burning in General Domains
    Theory of Computing Systems. Special Issue for SAGT 2015. Invited.
  3. Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions
    with D. Fotakis

    Algorithmica 76(1): 143-167 (2016)
  4. On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games
    with D. Fotakis

    ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 2(4): 15:1-15:37 (2014)
  5. Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games
    with D. Fotakis

    Theoretical Computer Science 472: 90-103 (2013)

Conference Proceedings

  1. Faster Sublinear Algorithms via Conditional Sampling
    in the 28th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2017
  2. Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
    in the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2016
  3. Mechanism Design with Selective Verification
    in the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2016
  4. Tight Hardness Results for Maximum Weight Rectangles
    in the 43rd Int'l Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2016
  5. Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue
    with C. Wilkens

    in the 12th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics, WINE 2016
  6. A Size-Free CLT for Poisson Multinomials and its Applications
    in the 48th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2016
  7. On the Structure, Covering and Learning of Poisson Multinomial Distributions
    in the 56th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2015
  8. Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
    in the 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2015
  9. Efficient Money Burning in General Domains
    in the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2015
  10. The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design
    in the 25th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2014
  11. Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
    in the 14th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2013
    Best Paper and Best Student Paper Award
  12. Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions
    with D. Fotakis

    in the 14th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2013
  13. On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games
    with D. Fotakis

    in the 40th Int'l Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2013
  14. Optimal Pricing is Hard
    in the 8th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics, WINE 2012
  15. Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games
    with D. Fotakis

    in the 6th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics, WINE 2010

Working Papers

  1. Ten Steps of EM Suffice for Mixtures of Two Gaussians
    NIPS 2016 Workshop on Non-Convex Optimization for Machine Learning.
  2. Improving Viterbi is Hard: Better Runtimes Imply Faster Clique Algorithms
    with A. Backurs

  3. Optimal Seat Pricing With Multiple Classes & Why Economy Seats Feel so Small

Awards and Honors

Miscellaneous